Book reviews by Editor, Reviews
 Literature & Aesthetics 25 2015   155 
Book Reviews 
 
Marion Gibson, Imagining the Pagan Past: Gods and Goddesses in 
Literature and History since the Dark Ages (Abingdon and New 
York, Routledge, 2013); pp. ix + 257; ISBN 978-0-415-67419-5. 
 
This volume examines the portrayal of Britain’s pagan past in British 
literature and historical accounts from the fifth century CE to late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries. Primarily looking at narratives relating to 
deities, rather than religious practice, Marion Gibson shows how even 
devout Christians were willing to incorporate a pagan past into their 
writings. 
 The first couple of chapters take the reader through the 
development of Britain’s pagan past, and the ideas of being associated with 
Rome and its legacy, in various writings from the early Middle Ages 
through to the Romantic Era. Moving to the eighteenth century, Gibson 
then discusses the Celtic Revival and its influence on British literature and 
ideas about Britain’s pagan history through to the mid-twentieth century. 
With examining the place of Anglo-Saxon, and other Germanic deities, 
Gibson returns to the Middle Ages and traces the place of these deities in 
sundry literature up to the 1970s. At this point, she then steps back to the 
prehistoric era, and how it was incorporated into fiction from 1850s, as it 
was at this time that archaeologists began discovering Neolithic and 
Palaeolithic sites and artefacts. The final chapter then discusses the period 
from the 1970s to the present day, and how literature from this era has been 
imagining Britain's pagan past.  
 It should be mentioned that the title of this volume may be seen as 
problematic, as it does not mention that the subject matter only regards 
Britain. For while the deities mentioned in this British literature are not 
always native to the British Isles, the cases in which they are mentioned all 
pertain to Britain, and its history. It also uses the out-dated terminology of 
‘Dark Ages’ rather than the preferred ‘early Middle Ages’ or ‘early 
medieval era’. Given the significant time-frame across which British 
literature is examined, the volume is brief and lacks detail. However, it is a 
good entry point for someone looking into this area for the first time, or 
wanting basic knowledge on how pagan deities were incorporated into the 
literature and ideas of history in Britain. It also does not really discuss how 
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these pagan deities in the literature have affected people personally, or have 
shaped the religious landscape. Indeed, Gerald Gardner, father to the 
modern pagan religion Wicca and his work are discussed, but how Wicca, 
and the work of similar modern Pagan leaders, has affected the religio-
spirituality of contemporary individuals and groups is not.  
This volume would be of great use as a starting point for someone 
researching the inclusion of paganism in literature at any point during the 
vast time-frame it covers. It would be recommended to undergraduates, and 
also anyone with a beginner’s interest in the area. 
 
Lauren Bernauer 
University of Sydney 
 
 
William E. Arnal, Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon, editors, Failure 
and Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion: Essays in Honor of 
Donald Wiebe (Sheffield, UK, Equinox, 2012); pp. xii + 243; ISBN 
978-1-84553-898-9. 
 
Referring to Wiebe’s “thesis that the academic study of religion suffers 
from a failure of intellectual nerve”, the editors and “contributors to this 
volume”, while not accepting every facet of Wiebe’s argument, “all share 
the view that conceptualizing religion as an element of the mundane world 
of human doings is the first requirement of a public inquiry into the history 
and function of religion” (p. vii). Wiebe’s famous thesis is reprinted in this 
book, and has him arguing against the re-establishing of a role for theology 
in Religious Studies, which “constitutes a rejection of the 
scientific/academic goals it originally espoused” (p. 7). Recognising that a 
‘little c’ confessional approach can also come from non-exclusivist 
adherents, he asserts that assuming the existence of God/gods is 
incompatible with a proper academic study of religion (pp. 8-10). Wiebe 
goes on to rightfully dismiss the attitude that Studies in Religion should be 
descriptive only (pp. 13-16). Indeed, there has as yet been no cogent 
argument against the explanatory and evaluative approaches. While not 
necessarily of interest to all scholars, particularly those who espouse 
postmodernism, these are certainly not wholly irrelevant. In fact, such 
approaches are already used by secular philosophers of religion – a field 
dominated by theists. Finding that much of the work done in Religious 
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Studies departments is crypto-theology, even unashamedly so, Wiebe goes 
on to “reiterate here that theology, when it commits itself to the existence 
of the Ultimate, constitutes a form of religious thought that can only 
“infect” the academic study of religion and not complement it” (pp. 26-27). 
An ally is found in Luther Martin, who praises the use of 
‘methodological atheism’ in studying religion, and hails Wiebe’s efforts as 
strengthening our field (pp. 3-5). This Festschrift of sorts continues with a 
series of chapters meant to describe some ‘general failures’ of nerve in the 
academic study of religion. The first chapter proper actually has Matthew 
Day disagreeing considerably with Wiebe, asserting that it is the lack of 
evaluating the claims made by the religious that “unites the hopelessly 
disjointed field of religious studies”, and haughtily declaring that 
“attending to “the truth of religion” is largely irrelevant for any academic 
study of religion worth having” (p. 34). Day invokes an example 
concerning the British conflicts with the Swazi in the 1930’s, focussing on 
religious claims made by the latter, declaring that “It simply doesn’t matter 
if this story is true, false, or an outright lie” (pp. 39-41, emphasis in 
original), arrogantly assuming that only his intellectual pursuits are 
worthwhile, whilst ignoring the obvious possibilities that certain historians, 
psychologists, and philosophers would be keenly interested. His further 
claim that considering the veridicality of the Swazi claims is to “muddy the 
waters”, is absurd and even anti-intellectual, as if increasing our knowledge 
– especially regarding the truth – were to be considered a bad thing, and not 
the point of our scholarly existence! Interestingly, such a self-serving 
attitude can offend believers and non-believers alike. 
Chapters more appreciative of Wiebe’s approach follow, from 
feminist scholar Darlene Juschka and Janet Klippenstein, who focuses on 
the Psychology of Religion. A highlight in the ‘general failures’ part of the 
book is the chapter by McCutcheon, who effectively describes crypto-
theologians as uncritical and ignorant (pp. 78-79), and advocates an 
outsider or etic approach, “rather than one that elevates select emic terms or 
interests to etic status and thus legitimacy” (p. 88). Johannes Wolfart is also 
supportive, claiming that “practitioners of Religious Studies still habitually 
suspect each other of hidden agendas”, and notes that, in failing to heed 
Wiebe’s warnings against ‘small c’ confessional theology, we have merely 
shifted the focus from Christianity, or at least feigned this, through names 
of university programs such as ‘Religions of Late Antiquity’ and ‘Religion 
in America’ (pp. 102-105). 
Book Reviews 
Literature & Aesthetics 25 2015 158 
The remaining chapters indicate ‘special failures’ of nerve. Herbert 
Berg brilliantly recognises that Islamic studies are not at all immune to 
crypto-theology, despite the fact that many scholars of Islam are not current 
or former Muslims (p. 112). He suspects that the heavy focus on Sufism, as 
the ‘genuine’ or “nice face of Islam”, is political (p. 114), notes that the 
historical Muhammad looks suspiciously like the Qur’anic Muhammad (p. 
116), and bemoans the attitude that descriptivism is virtuous whilst 
revisionism is allegedly rude and racist (pp. 117-119). Aaron Hughes 
expresses similar sentiments concerning contemporary Islam, noting a 
common thought in Islamic Studies which says that the Islams “practiced 
by the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, Wahhabi and neo-Wahhabi groups – are 
somehow inauthentic precisely because they stray from a pure, divine, and 
revealed original message” (pp. 142-143). He boldly describes the field’s 
rejection of “what has now been pejoratively labeled as “Orientalist” 
approaches (e.g., archaeology, source critical, redaction criticism)”, and its 
preference towards “confessional and descriptive approaches” (pp. 143-
144). 
The remaining chapters, by Michel Desjardins, John Parrish, Sarah 
Rollens, Vaia Touna, and the late T. Nicholas Schonhoffer, broadly discuss 
failures of nerve regarding Christian Studies, such as how Christian origins 
often serves a theological agenda, with Schonhoffer wondering why a 
violent parable in a non-canonical text is rejected as inauthentic, when 
Jesus was arguably violent himself, and made use of several violent 
parables in the canonical scriptures (pp. 197-201). Finally, Arnal and Braun 
present a pseudo-conclusion, which seems largely counter-productive. For 
example, they claim that by examining the sacred, we make it sacred (pp. 
231-232). Surely this can be said of any field of study. They also assert that 
we ought to leave Religion to the religious, while we study “religious 
objects”, without the reverence traditionally accorded them, which is partly 
apparent in the names granted to specialist fields (pp. 233-235). Strangely, 
the expected recommendations failed to eventuate, leaving this reader 
wondering whether these parting comments and underdeveloped 
‘conclusion’ were altogether necessary. I will continue to be hypercritical 
towards religious claims, while still happily calling my primary area of 
focus Philosophy of Religion/s, rather than, say, Philosophy of Some 
Things That Some People Find Special but That Really Are Not. 
Nevertheless, Failure and Nerve is a useful collection of essays that, 
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together, reveal that there is still work to be done in making Religious 
Studies a properly objective and scientific discipline. 
 
Raphael Lataster 
University of Sydney 
 
 
Robert MacSwain and Taylor Worley, editors, Theology, Aesthetics, and 
Culture: Responses to the Work of David Brown (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012); pp. xiv + 313; ISBN 978-0-19-964682-1. 
 
The legacy of David Brown (Professor of Theology, Aesthetics, and 
Culture, and Wardlaw Professor at the University of St Andrew’s) has, thus 
far, been embodied in a quintet of works published between 1999 and 2008, 
namely, Tradition and Imagination (1999), Discipleship and Imagination 
(2000), God and Enchantment of Place (2004), God and Grace of Body 
(2007), and God and Mystery in Words (2008). These were celebrated at a 
2010 conference held at the Institute for Theology, Imagination, and the 
Arts convened by the editors of this volume. Many of the papers delivered 
at that conference, including seven additional chapters, make up the bulk of 
the book under consideration; the reason I list the five publications above is 
because their titles inspired the names of the main sections of this volume, 
which follow them verbatim. Scholars from various disciplines have 
contributed chapters on the themes addressed by Brown’s books in an 
attempt to nuance, critique, or advocate his encompassing vision for the 
meaningful encounter between Christian theology and art and culture. The 
basis for such an encounter is made explicit by MacSwain’s ‘Introduction’ 
(pp. 1-10) and is repeated time and again by the contributors, namely, that: 
human imagination no less than reason is essential to the theological 
enterprise; that Scripture is not a fixed text but a manifestation of a living 
and moving tradition; that revelation is a culturally enmeshed, fallibly-
mediated, and progressively-grasped phenomenon; and that divine action, 
grace, and truth are to be found outside the Christian Church as well as 
within, in secular philosophy and other religions no less than through the 
work of painters, sculptors, writers, composers, musicians, dancers, 
athletes… (p. 5) 
Not all of the contributors, however, agree with Brown; and whilst his 
project is much lauded for moving beyond the restricting confines of 
biblicism to address the world at large from a Christian point of view, 
nevertheless some of his views remain contentious. For instance, in order to 
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offset the narrow biblicism that conditions much Protestant – even some 
Catholic – theology, Brown argues for the rehabilitation of tradition, and of 
viewing both scripture and tradition as ‘products’ of divine revelation. 
Most traditional Christians would agree with such a view. But in order to 
make room for a Christian engagement with other religions, Brown also 
suggests that this revelation can be seen as continuing in Judaism and Islam 
(p. 16, cf. p. 43); a highly problematic idea given that all three religions 
contradict each other in their rival claims to disclose the truth concerning 
God. According to William J. Abraham, Brown’s view is based logically 
on the incarnation of God the Son as Jesus Christ, within which “there was 
a radical ‘divine accommodation’ to the relevant context” (p. 17, cf. pp. 31, 
39) that is reflected in scripture, tradition, other religions, and, by 
extension, all other aspects of human cultural activity which are influenced 
by and imaginatively grasp out towards the divine. All very well and good; 
but then in order to demonstrate the continuing relevance of the 
incarnation, Brown overemphasises the humanity of Christ – with 
references to the ongoing development and change (in order to remain 
relevant to a changing world) of the Lord’s body in its ‘post-mortem’ state 
(p. 200), and to a “limited human consciousness remaining” in Christ even 
after the ascension (p. 294). In response to Brown’s comments about 
change and development in the ascended Christ, Graham Ward argues that 
in the ascension Christ’s humanity “is assumed into the Godhead” (p. 207) 
and thus “historical existence is assumed into His eternal existence” (p. 
209). As a Church historian, I would note that the positions of Brown and 
Ward seem to oscillate between quasi-Nestorianism and quasi-
Monophysitism respectively. The traditional disposition to the incarnational 
unity-in-diversity in Christ, paradoxically articulated at the council of 
Chalcedon (in 451 CE) which maintained that he is both God and man in 
such a way that the properties of his divine and human natures are distinctly 
preserved in the unity of his personhood, is by-passed here for mere 
speculation concerning what happens to either nature at various junctures in 
his divine economy. Traditional Christology asserts that whereas something 
changes in the quality or intensity of Christ’s humanity after his 
resurrection, nevertheless his humanity is never abolished or diminished; it 
is not assumed into the Godhead. 
I mention traditional Christology only because it represents a 
‘middle way’ that avoids the extremes reached by both Brown and Ward. In 
any case, the incarnation, for Brown, remains the bedrock for our 
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imaginative impulse towards God, as reflected, for instance, in 
hagiography, which Brown describes as fictional tales (pp. 56, 65) that can 
allow us to have some idea of what it is like to lead a life in imitation of 
Christ in historical contexts other than Christ’s own (p. 55). At the same 
time, however, Brown advocates the efficacy of prayers to saints as our 
intercessors before Christ, an inconsistency picked up by Richard 
Bauckham, who reflects the traditional Protestant rejection of sainthood in 
his response that fictional figures cannot intercede for anybody (p. 60). 
Brown, to his credit, tries to overcome this difficulty, but one wonders as to 
why he did not assert more emphatically the relevance of the lives of the 
saints and their experience irrespective of the literary ‘embellishments’ in 
some of their biographies. This ambivalence towards saints comes up again 
in Brown’s assessment of Orthodox iconography, which, for instance, is 
criticised as emphasising the transcendence of the figures being portrayed 
(pp. 94-95, 277) which makes them far too remote to the Christian believer; 
a point contested by Gordon Graham in his chapter when he affirms that 
icons have an important place in Orthodox Christian worship insofar as “it 
is not the icon itself that is venerated, but the person represented within it” 
(p. 97). This is a good first step in critiquing Brown’s position; but in 
reality for the Orthodox veneration is not aimed exclusively at the person 
represented, instead including the actual representation, the icon. This not 
only contradicts Brown’s assertion that icons are too transcendent – since in 
the process of veneration the gap between the ‘mundane’ and the 
transcendent is bridged – but brings into our discussion the theological 
basis for iconography, which is similar to what Brown claims is the basis 
for his own project: the incarnation. In Orthodox Christianity, the 
incarnation means that God the Son assumed not just human nature, but all 
matter. This means that material elements can be used to positively depict 
Christ and his saints, denoting once again that iconography does not merely 
depict the transcendent; it is transcendence-in-materiality, or, in the case of 
the saints, human persons in a gracefully divinised state, who are depicted 
for veneration (whereas worship is directed to God alone).  
Despite theological shortcomings such as those signalled above, 
there is much merit to this volume. It is an impressive achievement in terms 
of its scope, the variety of the topics addressed, and its attempt to engage 
with broader milieus outside the realm of theology, including music and 
dance. Nevertheless, since Professor Brown claims to be having recourse to 
the general Christian tradition, it is my hope that he seriously investigates 
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other areas of this tradition and experience, such as those of the Orthodox 
churches of all colours. Such an enlarged investigation might fill in some of 
the gaps in his narrative, and help him in his commendable effort to present 
a fuller account of Christianity for its positive engagement with art and 
culture. 
 
Mario Baghos 
St Andrew’s Greek Orthodox Theological College 
 
 
David Werther and Mark D. Linville, editors, Philosophy and the Christian 
Worldview: Analysis, Assessment and Development (London, 
Bloomsbury, 2014); pp. xiv + 274; ISBN 978-1-6235-6765-5. 
 
This book was supposed to provide a justification for theistic – and 
particularly Christian – exclusivism. The introduction states as much, 
rightly noting that seriously examining religious claims is to accord them 
respect, and also taunts Religious Studies scholars and their supposedly 
pluralistic tendencies (pp. 1-5). The book aims to examine various religious 
claims and systems, in order to “determine which, if any is right” (p. 7). It 
is inexplicable, then, that the vast majority of the book’s chapters do not 
even attempt to prove the truth of theism, let alone Christian theism, while 
the more relevant chapters offer nothing convincing to support the 
exclusivist view. Though suffering from a lack of quality references, the 
first chapter, by Keith Yandell, successfully argues that philosophy of 
religion is possible, and even worthwhile. This should be uncontroversial, 
so long as the focus lies with scientific and historical claims. 
Problems accumulate with the second chapter, by Harold Netland, 
whose piece on religious pluralism is tainted by his “thinking carefully 
about religious diversity in ways disciplined by the witness of Scripture” 
(p. 25). His claim that religious pluralism’s rejection of certain aspects of 
various religions should count against its plausibility (p. 39) is supremely 
illogical; ‘false aspects’ would be expected, as all traditions would perceive 
‘the Real’ differently. Netland fails to overcome the problems associated 
with religious diversity by outlining a case for Christian theism, only 
mentioning that Yandell’s work gives good reasons to believe, without 
stating what they are (p. 45). In the third chapter, Paul Copan aims to 
explain why theism is preferable to naturalism, while acknowledging that 
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he could have contrasted theism’s greater explanatory power over 
alternatives such as pantheism (p. 50), which would have made for a more 
interesting essay. Copan’s ignorance is evident with such choice quotations 
as “non-theistic “religious” alternatives like Buddhism…” (p. 51) and his 
supposing that the naturalist must overcome “monumental hurdles” such as 
creatio ex nihilo and the existence of an objective morality (p. 53). While 
his theistic/naturalistic comparison fails, far more disappointing is Copan’s 
failure to show that Christian theism, or even theism, is more preferable 
over non-naturalistic alternatives. 
The following four chapters on epistemology are occasionally 
defensive and do not actually attempt to argue for the likelihood of the 
Christian worldview. Of note is Charles Taliaferro’s correct claim that 
theistic religious experiences can be found among Muslims and other 
theists, and that some of the differences with such experiences may be “less 
radical than they first appear” (p. 104), which not only overlooks the 
primary purpose of the book, but counters it. The eighth chapter, by 
Linville, merely outlines his personal preference for Christian morality, 
failing to demonstrate that it is logically or evidentially preferable. In the 
following chapter on the evidential argument from evil, Michael Peterson 
does better in alluding to Bayesian and probabilistic methods (p. 191), but 
offers no good evidence to support the likelihood of any reason God may 
have to permit gratuitous suffering, and (once again) does not at all argue 
for theism or Christianity. Paul Reasoner’s interesting and worthwhile 
chapter, which highlights some similarities between Christianity and 
Confucianism, seems out of place in this volume; perhaps an editing 
mistake. 
The eleventh chapter, by William Hasker, tackles the important 
issue of substance dualism. Recognising that the concept is commonly 
rejected by leading philosophers of mind (p. 215), Hasker only truly argues 
for its possibility, rather than its probability (p. 219). Such fallacious 
appeals to possibility are common in Philosophy of Religion, as evidenced 
by Noel Hendrickson’s proceeding chapter on free will. Hendrickson 
commendably acknowledges that with all the discussion about free will, it 
is oft given a ‘free pass’, with few discussing the evidence for its very 
existence, and he further doubts that there can be decisive evidence for it 
(pp. 241-242). Suffering from some illogical reasoning (such as the appeal 
to simplicity), this chapter makes no attempt to argue for 
theism/Christianity, and even notes the importance of the concept to many 
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Jews and Muslims (p. 249). In the thirteenth and final chapter, Werther also 
offers nothing convincing to further the case for Christian theism, in an 
essay that seems overly theological, with its all-too-casual references to 
Christ and Satan. He aims to defend the notion that Christ could have been 
fully human and fully divine, without providing any reasons for why the 
uncommitted scholar should think that Jesus was even ‘partly divine’. 
Philosophy and the Christian Worldview fails to justify Christian 
particularism, or even theistic exclusivism; it barely even attempts to do so. 
Insofar as merely highlighting the recent work of Christian philosophers, it 
provides nothing impressive. Perhaps the book’s most significant 
contribution to the discipline comes from Hendrickson’s inadvertently 
drawing attention to one of the great deficiencies of apologetic philosophy 
of religion: so much effort is expended in defending the possibility of 
various concepts, rather than arguing for their probability. Rare is the 
academic field in which the mere appeal to possibility provides such a 
cornerstone. This does, however, bring to mind the downplaying of primary 
sources – which are obviously of supreme importance – by many Historical 
Jesus researchers, simply because none are extant. Likewise, I take the 
heavy focus on what may be possible by Christian philosophers of religion 
as an effective admission that they really have nothing substantial to offer 
with regards to arguing for their views being probable. 
 
Raphael Lataster 
University of Sydney 
 
 
 
